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Abstract. Autonomy is a necessary part of the design of agents flex-
ible enough to function effectively and efficiently in a sophisticated
world. Much work, however, has taken a very restricted view of what
is entailed by autonomous interaction; in particular, the effects of an
interaction have, to some extent, been guaranteed. In this paper, we
argue that no facet of interaction can ever be guaranteed, and that if
agents are to be autonomous, they must be able to cope with this in-
herent uncertainty. We propose a model of autonomous interaction in
response, which addresses these concerns, and which can be viewed
as a process of motivated discovery. This approach has two impor-
tant aspects: first, modelling the motivations of the agent allows a
more adequate model of autonomy to be achieved, and also provides
a control strategy for the process of interaction; second, the discov-
ery paradigm provides a suitable framework for effective action and
reasoning in an uncertain environment.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the design of autonomous agents: what
it means for an agent to be autonomous and what that entails for
any adequate model of interaction between such agents. Complex
environments admit an inherent uncertainty that must be considered
if we are to cope with more than just toy problems. In such an
uncertain environment, an agent must be autonomous; an agent cannot
know in advance the exact effects of its or others’ actions. This is of
paramount importance, and an agent must therefore be designed with
a flexibility that enables it to cope with this uncertainty by evaluating
it and responding to it in adequate ways.
Autonomy allows the design of agents flexible enough to function
effectively and efficiently in a sophisticated world [4]. Typically, real
autonomy has been neglected in most research. We hear of benevo-
lent, altruistic, trusting, sympathetic or cooperative agents, yet a truly
autonomous agent will behave only in a selfish way. Cooperation, for
example, should occur only as a consequence of an agent’s selfish-
ness. Autonomy allows for no artificially imposed rules of behaviour;
all behaviour must be a consequence of the understanding and pro-
cessing capabilities of that agent. Modelling this fundamental notion
of selfish behaviour and the generation of goals by such a selfish
autonomous agent is of vital importance in the design of autonomous
agents.
Autonomy is independence. It is a state that does not rely on any
external entity for purposeful existence.
In this paper, we use an existing agent framework previously used
to respecify Social Dependence Networks [7] and the Contract Net
Protocol [8] to address the issues that arise in a consideration of au-
tonomous interaction. We begin by considering several problems that
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are prevalent in existing models of interaction, and which must be
addressed in attempting to construct a model of autonomous interac-
tion. Then we introduce a previously developed agent framework on
which the remainder of the paper is based. The next sections describe
and specify an autonomous social agent that acts in an environment,
the way in which it generates its goals, and finally how it interacts
with others in its environment. We discuss how this can be viewed as
a process of discovery, and what such a view usefully brings to the
problem.
2 Autonomous Interaction
In multi-agent systems, the interactions between agents are the basis
for usefully exploiting the capabilities of others. However, such a
pragmatic approach has not been the concern of many researchers who
instead often focus on small areas of interaction and communication,
and in particular on specialised forms of intention recognition and
interpretation.
In many existing models of interaction, agents are not autonomous.
In considering these models, we can identify problem-issues in au-
tonomous interaction. Our intention is simply to show why these
models are not adequate for autonomous interaction, and so isolate
problems which contribute to the non-autonomous nature of these
models.
Pre-determined Agenda Problem-solving can be considered to be
the task of finding actions that achieve current goals. Typically,
goals have been presented to systems without regard to the problem-
solving agent so that the process is divorced from the reality of
an agent in the world. This is inadequate for models of autonomy
which require an understanding of how such goals are generated
and adopted. Surprisingly, however, this is an issue which has re-
ceived very little attention with only a few notable exceptions (e.g.
[14]).
Benevolence In traditional models of goal adoption, goals are broad-
cast by one agent, and adopted by other agents according to their
own relevant competence [17]. This assumes that agents are al-
ready designed with common or non-conflicting goals that facili-
tate the possibility of helping each other satisfy additional goals.
Negotiation as to how these additional goals are satisfied typically
takes the form of mere goal-node allocation. Thus an agent simply
has to communicate its goal to another agent for cooperation in the
form of joint planning to ensue. The concept of benevolence —
that agents will cooperate with other agents whenever and wher-
ever possible — has no place in modelling autonomous agents
[6, 9]. Cooperation will occur between two parties only when it
is considered advantageous to each party to do so. Autonomous
agents are thus selfish agents. A goal (whether traditionally viewed
as ‘selfish’ or ‘altruistic’) will always be adopted so as to satisfy a
‘selfish’ motivation.
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Guaranteed Effects Speech Act Theory (SAT) [3, 16] underlies
much existing work in AI [5], typically because as Appelt points
out, speech acts are categorizable and can be modelled as action
operators in a planning environment [2]. However, this work ad-
mits a serious flaw. Although the preconditions of these operators
are formulated in terms of the understanding of the planning agent,
the post-conditions or effects of these operators do not update the
understanding of the planning agent, but of the agent at whom the
action is directed [1]. No agent can ever actually know with any
certainty anything about the effects of an action, whether com-
municative or otherwise. It is only through an understanding of
the target agent and through observing the future behaviour of
that agent, that the agent can discover the actual effects of the in-
teraction. This uncertainty is inherent in communication between
autonomous agents and must be a feature of any model of interac-
tion which hopes to reflect this reality.
Automatic Intention Recognition A related though distinct prob-
lem with using SAT in the design of communication models in-
volves the notion that the meaning of an utterance is a function
of the linguistic content of that utterance. SAT is unable (even
when one tries to force rather undistinguished ad-hoc rules [11])
to model any kind of utterance where the linguistic content is not
very close to the speaker’s intended meaning. That is to say that
the operators themselves are context independent, and information
about how context affects the interpretation of utterances is not ex-
plicitly captured. Communication varies from utterances with a
meaning identical to linguistic content through utterances which
have a meaning opposite to the linguistic content to utterances
where the meaning does not seem to be categorised at all by the
linguistic content. In short, Speech Act Theory cannot lead to a
model of autonomous interaction. It merely serves to describe a
very limiting case of linguistic communication at a suitable level
for planning operators. A more flexible account of how intention
is recovered from a multitude of different utterances is required.
Multi-Agent Modelling This is another related but more subtle prob-
lem. Much work has modelled communicative actions in terms of
mutual beliefs about the operator and its known effects [15]. This
proposes to show not only how certain mental states lead to speech
actions, but how speech actions affect mental states. We argue that
any account of autonomous interaction should only model the ef-
fects of an action upon the mental state of the agent initiating the
interaction (or another single agent).
In summary, there are several important claims here: first, an agent
cannot be truly autonomous if its goals are provided by external
sources; second, an agent will only adopt a goal and thus engage in
an interaction if it is to its advantage to do so; third, the effects of
an interaction cannot be guaranteed; fourth, the intentions of others
cannot always be recognised; fifth, an agent can only know about
itself.
Note that the first claim requires goals to be generated from within.
It is this internal goal generation that demands an explicit model of
the motivations of the agent. The second claim requires a notion of
advantage that can only be determined in relation to the motivations
of the agent. The third and fourth claims demand that the uncer-
tain nature of autonomous interaction be explicitly addressed. We
argue that viewing autonomous interaction as motivated discovery
provides us with a means for doing this. Finally, the fifth claim im-
poses constraints on the problem we are considering, and provides
a strong justification for our concern with constructing a model of
autonomous interaction from the perspective of an individual agent.
3 The Agent Framework
We must first provide some basic concepts using the specification
language Z [18] on which to base a subsequent analysis. The world is
made up of basic entities which can be instantiated as objects, agents
and autonomous agents [12]. An entity consists of four constituents
as follows: a set of attributes, which are perceivable qualities of the
entity; a set of actions, which definethe basic capabilities of the agent;
a set of goals, which are the goals that can be ascribed to the entity
which characterise its agency; and a set of internal non-derivable
motivations which define an entity’s autonomy .
Entity
attributes : Attribute
capableof : Action
goals : Goal
motivations : Motivation
attributes 6= fg
An autonomousagent is an entity which can generate its own goals
through motivations. It is an entity with non-empty sets of capabilities,
goals and motivations.
AutonomousAgent
Entity
capableof 6= fg ^ goals 6= fg ^ motivations 6= fg
A full treatment, with justifications, of the different entities which
arise in this view of the world can be found in [12].
4 A Model of Autonomous Interaction
An interaction episode is initiated by an agent in attempting to satisfy
a goal demanded by its motivations, generating a prediction speci-
fying an action intended to achieve the desired effect in the current
environment. This section examines this in detail, and specifies what
is involved in autonomous interaction. It begins by reviewing some
necessary schemas given elsewhere [12] and used here to define a
social agent, omitting some specific details due to space constraints.
4.1 Constructing a Social Agent
An environment is defined to be a simple set of attributes that de-
scribes all of the features of the world. The environment thus repre-
sents all possible percepts in a uniform way. It is convenient also to
define a View to be the perception of an Environment by an agent
in the same way.
Environment == Attribute
View == Attribute
An agent in an environment can perceive certain attributes subject
to its capabilities and current state but, due to limited resources, may
not be able to perceive all attributes. The action of an agent is based on
a subset of attributes of the environment, the agent’s actual percepts.
Thus in the schemabelow for agent perception,perceivingactions
is a subset of agent capabilities. Two functions specify what the agent
perceives: canperceive is applied to the current environment and
the agent’s capabilities to give potential percepts and willperceive is
applied to its motivations, goals and the current environment to give
attributes actually perceived.
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AutonomousAgentPercepts
AutonomousAgent
perceivingactions : Action
canperceive : Environment"Action
Environment
willperceive : Motivation"Goal"
Environment"View
An interaction with the environment occurs as a result of perform-
ing actions in it. Its effects on the environment are determined by
applying the eectinteract function in the axiom definition below to
the current environment and the actions taken. It is always in scope.
eectinteract : Environment"
Action Environment
To specify the actions of an autonomous agent, the next schema
includes the AutonomousAgent schema and then defines an action-
selection function that is determined in relation to the motivations,
goals, perceived environment and actual environment of the agent.
The function gives the set of actions the agent will perform in order
to achieve some goal.
AutonomousAgentAct
AutonomousAgent
autoactions : Motivation"Goal"
View" Environment"Action
We also need to define the state of an agent as follows by in-
cluding the previous schemas and the current environment, and in-
troducing variables for possible percepts, posspcpts , actual percepts,
actualpcpts , and the actions selected, willdo.
AutonomousAgentState
AutonomousAgentPercepts
AutonomousAgentAct
env : Environment
posspcpts;actualpcpts : View
willdo : Action
actualpcpts  posspcpts
posspcpts = canperceive env perceivingactions
actualpcpts = willperceivemotivations goals posspcpts
willdo = autoactionsmotivations goals actualpcpts env
All this defines autonomous agents, but we require more if they
are to engage in interaction or communication episodes. Specifically,
in order for effective interaction and communication, an agent must
be able to group the attributes that make up the environment into
entity-describing models so that it can identify the other individuals
in the world. A social agent is an agent that is aware of other agents
and their role and function through these models. The schema below
includes models of other autonomous agents available to the social
agent as autoagts . Models of agents and objects are also possible
and are excluded only due to space constraints.
SocialAgent
AutonomousAgentState
autoagts : AutonomousAgent
autoagts 6= fg
4.2 Goal Generation
As stated above, in order for an agent to be autonomous, it must
generate goals from motivations. The initial point in any interaction is
when this goal generation process occurs. In this section, we describe
how an autonomous agent, defined in terms of its somewhat abstract
motivations, can construct goals or concrete states of affairs to be
achieved in the environment. Our model requires a repository of
known goals which capture knowledge of limited and well-defined
aspects of the world. These goals describe particular states or sub-
states of the world with each autonomous agent having its own such
repository. An agent tries to find a way to mitigate motivations by
selecting an action to achieve an existing goal or by retrieving a goal
from a repository of known goals, as considered below.
In order to retrieve goals to mitigate motivations, an autonomous
agent must have some way of assessing the effects of competing or
alternative goals. Clearly, the goals which make the greatest posi-
tive contribution to the motivations of the agent should be selected.
The GenerateGoal schema below describes at a high level an au-
tonomous agent monitoring its motivations for goal generation. First,
the social agent changes indicated by ∆SocialAgent , and a new vari-
able representing the repository of available known goals, goalbase ,
is declared. Then, the motivational effect on an autonomous agent
of satisfying a set of new goals is given. The motiveect function
returns a numeric value representing the motivational effect of sat-
isfying a set of goals with a particular configuration of motivations
and a set of existing goals. The predicate part specifies that all goals
currently being pursued must be known goals that already exist in
the goalbase. Finally, there is a set of goals in the goalbase that has a
greater motivational effect than any other set of goals, and the current
goals of the agent are updated to include the new goals.
GenerateGoal
∆SocialAgent
goalbase : Goal
motiveect : Motivation"Goal"Goal"
goals  goalbase ^ goals
0
 goalbase
9 gs : Goal j gs  goalbase 
(8os : Goal j os 2 ( goalbase) 
(motiveectmotivations goals gs 
motiveect motivations goals os)
^ goals
0
= goals [ gs)
4.3 Agent Interaction
Once the goals defining the purpose of the interaction are generated,
the agent can continue in its attempt to achieve those goals.
Many traditional models of interaction have assumed an ideal
world in which unfounded assumptions have given rise to inade-
quate characterisations of interaction amongst autonomous agents.
If we consider autonomous interaction to be a process of uncertain
outcome (which it must be), then we can characterise it in a more
general way as a process of discovery in terms of the effects of ac-
tions. This allows us to deal effectively with the inherent uncertainty
in interaction. In the following discussion, we will begin to introduce
the language of discovery to make the relationships clear.
In order to make sense of our environment and to function ef-
fectively in it, we continually anticipate the effects of our actions
and utterances — we make predictions (or expectations) about what
will happen next. The action-selection function, autoactions , of the
AutonomousAgentAct schema encompasses the deliberation of the
Multi-Agent Systems 531 M. d’Inverno and M. Luck
agent. The action that is selected is intended to satisfy the goals of the
agent through its resulting effects and consequent changes to the en-
vironment. In the case of an interaction episode involving two agents,
the initiating agent selects an action that is intended to cause the de-
sired response in the responding agent. The uncertainty inherent in
such interaction means that the effects cannot be known in advance,
but can only be discovered after the event has taken place, or action
performed. We describe this by specifying the predicted effects of
actions selected in the AutonomousAgentAct schema by applying
the socialeectinteract function to the current view of the environ-
ment and those actions. The agent thus predicts that these actions will
change the environment to achieve the desired results. Remember that
the environment includes all of the entities in it, so that a change to
an agent in the environment will in turn cause a change to the envi-
ronment itself. We also introduce a variable to store an agent’s actual
percepts prior to an operation, oldpcpts .
SocialAgentPredict
SocialAgent
socialeectinteract : View"Action View
oldpcpts;prediction : View
prediction = socialeectinteract actualpcptswilldo
prediction \
S
goals 6= fg
In order to achieve the desired result, the relevant actions must be
performed. Effectively, this acts as an experiment, testing whether
the predictions generated are consistent with the resulting effects.
In this sense, experimentation is central to this model, for such in-
teraction with the environment is the only way in which an agent’s
understanding of its capabilities and its environment can be assessed
to bring to light inadequacies, inconsistencies and errors. When an
action is performed, it affects the models of other agents which, after
the change, are derived from the previous agent models and the view
of the environment through the updateagts function. These models
of agents are critical in determining if the action was successful.
SocialAgentInteract
SocialAgentPredict
updateagts : AutonomousAgent" View"
AutonomousAgent
The action also has an effect on the environment which changes
accordingly, and a similar effect on the agent itself whose percepts
also change. For example, in the case of an action which issues a
request to another agent to tell the current time, the resulting model
will either encode the fact that the agent is telling the time, or not.
By inspecting this model and its attributes, the requesting agent can
determine if its action has been successful. Note that the new value
of oldpcpts takes the previous value of actualpcpts for later use.
SocialEnv
∆SocialAgentPredict
SocialAgentInteract
env
0
= eectinteract env willdo
posspcpts
0
= canperceive env
0
perceivingactions
actualpcpts
0
= willperceivemotivations goals posspcpts
0
willdo
0
= autoactionsmotivations goals
actualpcpts
0
env
0
autoagts
0
= updateagts autoagts actualpcpts
0
oldpcpts
0
= actualpcpts
prediction
0
= prediction
Evaluating the results of the actions appears simple. At the most
basic level, it involves the comparison of predictions with obser-
vations. Thus if the intended effects of the actions and the actual
effects match, then the actions have achieved the desired result and
the episode is successful. If they are anomalous, then it reveals an er-
roneous understanding of the environment and the agents within it, or
an inadequate capability for perception of the results. The important
point here is that there is no guarantee of success, and failure can be
due to any number of reasons.
This analysis assumes that the evidence is perfect, however, which
may not always be appropriate. In any real environment this is not so,
and error can be introduced into evidence in a variety of ways, reduc-
ing the quality of the observed evidence accordingly. Not only may
there be inaccuracy due to the inherent uncertainty in both perform-
ing the actions and perception of the results (experimentation and
observation respectively), but also, if the actions taken by the agent
are communicative actions intended to elicit a response from another
autonomous agent, then there may be inaccuracy due to malicious
intent on the part of the responding agent by providing misleading
information, for example [13]. Thus the response may itself be the
vessel for the error.
In addition to assessing the fit of observations with predictions,
therefore, the quality of the observations themselves must also be
assessed in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable to be used
in the comparison at all. Simple tolerance levels for assessing the
acceptability of perceived evidence are inadequate, for they do not
consider the need for the interaction episode, and the importance of
achieving the desired result. The quality demanded of the observations
can thus only be assessed in relation to the motivations of the agent
which provide a measure of the importance of the situation, and
take into account the implications of success and failure. In medical
domains, for example, where the agents are highly motivated, even a
small degree of error in interaction concerning relevant patient details
may be unacceptable if it would lead to the loss of a patient’s life,
while neighbourly discussion of the weather with low motivations
and little importance may allow a far greater error tolerance.
The schemas below describe evaluation with two functions. First,
accept is applied to the capabilities of the agent, its perceived envi-
ronment before and after the actions were performed and the agent
models, and returns a boolean value indicating whether to accept the
evidence or not. The capabilities of the agent capture the uncertainty
information that arises from the agent itself, while the perceived en-
vironment and agent models include details of difficulties arising
through the environment, or other agents. The consider function
compares predictions and observations once evidence is accepted.
Note that the potentially difficult question of when observations match
predictions is bound up in the function itself which may be interpreted
either as a simple equality test or as something more sophisticated.
The Decide schema also states at the beginning that though the
agent changes as a result of this evaluation (∆SocialAgent), the state
of the agent remains the same (ΞAutonomousAgentState). Finally,
if the evidence is accepted, and the observations do not match the
predictions, then the agent models must be revised in an appropriate
way as specified by revisemodels which is not detailed here.
bool ::= True j False
SocialAgentEvaluate
accept : Action" View"
View"AutonomousAgent" bool
consider : View" View" bool
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Decide
∆SocialAgent
ΞAutonomousAgentState
SocialAgentPredict
SocialAgentEvaluate
revisemodels : View"
AutonomousAgent"AutonomousAgent
(accept capableof actualpcpts oldpcpts autoagts = True)
^ (consider prediction actualpcpts = False))
autoagts
0
= revisemodels actualpcpts autoagts
4.4 Summary
This model provides a unifying basis for much related work, with a
clear distinction of problem tasks. For example, Galliers’ work on
belief revision [10] incorporates just such evaluation, and revision:
the question of whether to revise by use of endorsements is clearly
subsumed by evaluation, and the belief revision itself is covered by
the revision that arises in the case of anomalous evidence. Our model,
however, makes these distinctions more explicit, and extends to cover
the preceding stages of prediction, experimentation and observation.
By taking autonomous interaction to be a process of discovery, we
can avoid the problems identified earlier of guaranteed effects and
automatic intention recognition. In discovery, no effects are known for
certain in advance, but instead, (tentative) predictions or expectations
of future states of the world can be generated. It is only possible to
be certain about effects once the actions have been carried out. This
can lead to a re-evaluation of existing models.
Additionally, we assert that the process of autonomous communi-
cation must be motivated, and consequently a motivated agent does
not have a pre-determined agenda, nor is it benevolent. Motivations
provide a means by which an agent can set its own agenda, or set its
own goals and determine which actions to perform in achieving them.
The effects of benevolent behaviour are possible, but only through
self-serving motivations. Moreover, because effects are not guaran-
teed, failure is always possible, but the combination of discovery
and motivations allow effective exploitation of these failures and also
recovery from them whenever possible.
5 Further Work and Conclusion
Our aim in constructing the model for autonomous interaction is am-
bitious. We are attempting to provide a common unifying framework
within which different levels of abstraction of reasoning, behavioural
and interaction tasks can be related and considered. This work seeks
to draw on the foundations established previously both for providing
a language with which to precisely discuss agent-based systems, and
for providing a base upon which to develop systems and models such
as that presented here. We have necessarily concentrated on a high-
level specification so that the key principles can be explicated, but
without sacrificing the need for preciseness through formality.
This paper has identified several important issues in autonomous
interaction which are relevant to the design and construction of au-
tonomous agents. We have described, and formally specified at a
high-level, a model for autonomous interaction based on a previously
developed framework, and have attempted to set it in the paradigm
of discovery. The combination of the two approaches, by explicitly
introducing motivated reasoning as part of the agent framework, and
the capacity for effectively dealing with dynamic worlds through dis-
covery, provides a way in which the inadequacies in existing models
may be addressed.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Allen, ‘A plan-based approach to speech act recognition’, Technical
Report 131, Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto,
(1979).
[2] D. E. Appelt, Planning English Sentences, Cambridge University Press,
1985.
[3] J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words, Oxford University Press,
1962.
[4] O. Boissier and Y. Demazeau, ‘A distributed artificial intelligence view
on general purpose vision systems’, in Decentralized AI 3: Proceedings
of the Third European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in
a Multi-Agent World, eds., E. Werner and Y. Demazeau, pp. 311–330.
Elsevier, (1992).
[5] J. A. Campbell and M. d’Inverno, ‘Knowledge interchange protocols’,
in Decentralized AI: Proceedings of the First European Workshop on
Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, eds., Y. De-
mazeau and J.-P. Mu¨ller, 63–80, Elsevier, (1990).
[6] C. Castelfranchi, ‘Social power’, in Decentralized AI: Proceedings of
the First European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a
Multi-Agent World, eds., Y. Demazeau and J.-P. Mu¨ller, pp. 49–62.
Elsevier, (1990).
[7] M. d’Inverno and M. Luck, ‘A formal view of social dependence net-
works’, in Proceedings of the First Australian DAI Workshop, Lecture
Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 1087, pp. 115–129. Springer Verlag,
(1996).
[8] M. d’Inverno and M. Luck, ‘Formalising the contract net as a goal
directed system’, in Agents Breaking Away: Proceedings of the Seventh
EuropeanWorkshopon Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent
World, LNAI 1038, eds., W. Van de Velde and J. W. Perram, pp. 72–85.
Springer-Verlag, (1996).
[9] J. R. Galliers, ‘The positive role of conflicts in cooperative multi-agent
systems’, in Decentralized AI: Proceedingsof the First EuropeanWork-
shop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, eds.,
Y. Demazeau and J.-P. Mu¨ller, Elsevier, (1990).
[10] J. R. Galliers, ‘Modelling autonomous belief revision in dialogue’, in
Decentralized AI 2: Proceedings of the Second European Workshop on
Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, eds., Y. De-
mazeau and J.-P. Mu¨ller, 231–245, Elsevier, (1991).
[11] H. P. Grice, ‘Logic and conversation’, in Syntax and Semantics, Volume
3: Speech Acts, eds., P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, 41–58, Academic Press,
(1975).
[12] M. Luck and M. d’Inverno, ‘A formal framework for agency and auton-
omy’, in Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multi-
Agent Systems, pp. 254–260. AAAI Press / MIT Press, (1995).
[13] S. Marsh, ‘Trust in distributed artificial intelligence’, in Artificial So-
cial Systems: Selected Papers from the Fourth European Workshop on
Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, LNAI 830, eds.,
C. Castelfranchi and E. Werner, pp. 94–114. Springer-Verlag: Heidel-
berg, Germany, (1994).
[14] T. J. Norman and D. Long, ‘Goal creation in motivated agents’, in
Intelligent Agents: Theories, Architectures, and Languages, LNAI 890,
eds., M. Wooldridge and N. R. Jennings, pp. 277–290. Springer-Verlag:
Heidelberg, Germany, (1995).
[15] C. R. Perrault, ‘An application of default logic to speech act theory’, in
Intentions in Communication, eds., P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E.
Pollack, 161–186, MIT Press, (1990).
[16] J. R. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, 1969.
[17] R. G. Smith, ‘The contract net protocol: High-level communication
and control in a distributed problem solver’, IEEE Transactions on
Computers, 29(12), 1104–1113, (1980).
[18] J. M. Spivey, The Z Notation, Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead, 2nd
edn., 1992.
Multi-Agent Systems 533 M. d’Inverno and M. Luck
